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Problematic Modell for Success
East German Nostalgia and Identity in Modern
Germany’s Attempt to Come-to-Terms with its DDR
Past
Joshua H. Whitcomb ‘19
Introduction: Two Pasts, One Modell
In late 2000, a few days shy of the 20th anniversary of Germany’s Tag der
deutschen Einheit (Day of Unity), The Chicago Tribune released an article titled
“German Reunification Truly a Success Story.” The article, written by conservative
Georgie Ann Geyer, praised the political experiment that brought together East
and West Germany, claiming it was “working” and “already one of the great
accomplishments of recent history.” 1 Peter Voss, a German Radio executive that
Geyer interviewed, applauded the former East’s “speed of normalization” and
reported that he was happy to see that the old communist ideology found “a
substitute” in the “better ways of the West.” However, the piece did more than
simply celebrate the rise of Western consumer culture, it incorrectly equated the
East’s communist dictatorship with that of the Nazi Third Reich. Geyer specifically
emphasized how “They [Germans] had been wrong in their Nazism and wrong in
their communism.” Declaring both regimes illegitimate, Geyer believes that the
commonality makes communism comparable to Nazism.
Furthermore, Geyer combined the two governments not only in her
condemnation but in her praise. This tactless journalism revealed a fundamental
misunderstanding of the different processes Germany underwent when moving
away from Nazism verses away from Communism. In the height of her praise
Geyer discusses the German Jewish population and made a point about the
Georgie Anne Geyer, “German Reunifacation Truly a Success Story,” The Chicago Tribune, (Chicago;
The Chicago Tribune, August 29, 2018)
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substantial growth, “now l00,000, up from 30,000 when the wall fell (and down
from 500,000 before Hitler).” Continuing her praise, she claims that Germany only
has “friends as neighbors,” and that their acts of reparations, such as paying
“enormous sums to the survivors of its terror,” qualifies Germany’s movement
away from Nazism a success. These statements, though, have nothing to do with
moving beyond East Germany’s Communism and suggest that there is a single
interpretation needed to come-to-terms with the history of both regimes. Geyer’s
American, capitalistic perspective is focused on the idea of quantitative success and
fails to acknowledge the fundamental and categorical differences between the two
regimes, erasing the important historical differences.
In 1933, Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party came to power within the
German Bundestag, and Germany’s democratic Weimar Republic soon gave way to a
fascist totalitarian state as Hitler consolidated power. With improved economic
stability and expansive infrastructure projects, Hitler’s Nazi Germany promised to
restore the glory of Germany’s past empires - ‘to make Germany great again.’
However, the Nazi totalitarian state soon came to represent a regime of terror,
oppression, and extermination for dissenters and individuals who fell outside the
Nazi racial ideology of the Germanic, Aryan master-race. As early as 1933, prisons
and concentration camps were filling up with “undesirables” such as communists,
homosexuals, people with disabilities, Jews, and Gypsies. By 1939, Nazi Germany
had declared a war of expansion and ethnic cleansing; by the war’s end in 1945, 1520 million people had been systematically murdered by the Nazi regime. 2
In contrast, the German Democratic Republic, or the die Deutsche
Demokratische Republik (DDR), was a socialist nation-state and Soviet, Eastern-Bloc
satellite state. The DDR lasted from 1949 to 1990. Following the Yalta Conference
of 1945, which divided the territories of the defeated Nazi Germany amongst the
Allies, Soviet premier Joseph Stalin began turning over control of the Soviet
occupation zone to the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), or the Socialist
Unity Party. Despite its lofty goals of overcoming Nazism through the creation of
socialist utopia, the ‘democratic’ part of the German Democratic Republic seemed
to quickly give way to Cold War pressures and corrupt leaders. During its 40-year
history, the DDR’s SED party went on to impose a dictatorial communist regime
which suppressed dissenters through censorship, intensive Stasi (secret police)
surveillance, and the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. In 1989, this wall
separating Germany’s two nations fell in a non-violent “Peaceful Revolution” and
in 1990 the BRD and DDR were reunified.
The 20th century has seen two distinct forms of German dictatorship rise
and fall, each with varying aims and degrees of wrongdoing. However, assumptions
Eric Lichtblau, “The Holocaust Just Got More Shocking,” The New York Times, (New York City: The
New York Times, March 1, 2013)
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like those in the Chicago Tribune article which compared genocidal, Nazi dictatorship
with SED dictatorship as equal ‘evils’ are by no means unique. Rather, they largely
reflect the mainstream Western approach to German Vergangenheitsbewältigung –
literally, “coming to terms with the past.” By the early- and mid- 1990s, West
Germany’s willingness to come to terms with its Nazi past was “increasingly seen
as a model for other countries” to overcome troubled histories. Modell Deutschland
received international praise and was, at the time, instilling a new kind of pride in
both sides of the political spectrum in Germany’s former West. Whether it be the
gold-plated cobblestones scattered throughout German cities commemorating
Holocaust victims, the indoctrinations of Erbschuld (inherited guilt) in textbook, or
monuments with the slogan Nie wieder! (never again), by the end of the 20th century
Germany was the undisputed Weltmeister im Erinnern (world-champion of
remembrance).3 In the 1990s, Princeton’s Jan Werner-Müller establishes that “it
was then generally assumed that coming to terms with the East German [DDR]
past…would come to fit the same success story.” 4
Two decades later, however, there is no evidence to suggest that
mainstream Western notions of Vergangenheitsbewältigung have changed significantly.
A German friend I knew once made a comment to me regarding the nature of
academic discourse about the DDR period from his experience in the Bavarian
school system: “you always find the DDR period and the Nazi period linked
together in some form or another in those colorful little text boxes on the side of
textbook pages. It’s always something about Germany’s two great evils and all
that… ” This view is even reproduced to a larger degree inside Germany by official
regime voices. According to the German Government’s Bundesstiftung zur
Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur (Federal Foundation for the Reappraisal of the SEDDictatorship) the reality of “coming to terms…with the communist past in United
Germany” is still very much a process measured in the same terms as (West)
Germany overcoming Nazism. In the foundation’s 2011 brochure, the DDR and
Nazi periods are immediately juxtaposed in an introduction which considers the
“obvious contrasts” and common “structural elements” of Germany’s “two
dictatorships.” Furthermore, features of the “program” presented in the brochure
outline how Germany “coming-to-terms” with its communist past
(decommunization, if you will) closely resembles the “denazification” and the stillpresent post-Nazi Vergangenheitsbewältigung. Similarities can be seen in the purges of
political elites, widespread trials, financial restitution and memorializing of victims,

Jan-Werner Müller, “Just another Vergangenheitsbewältigung? The Process of Coming to Terms with
the East German Past Revisited,” Oxford German Studies, 38:3, (London: Taylor & Francis, 2009) 334344.
4 Müller, 335.
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the restructuring of education and above all, a kind of penitence through guilt and
acknowledgement of past evils – the Erbschuld (inherited guilt).5
Few can deny the fundamental and holistic moral failure of German
society which culminated in the totalitarian Unrechtstaat of the Third Reich. It is
largely a black and white issue: Nazism was illegitimate and wrong and democracy
is legitimate and good, therefore Nazism and its associations were naturally to be
purged from German society through denazification and replaced with democratic
values. We are then, according to this Modell Deutschland-formula, to assume the
same was true for East German communist dictatorship. Capitalist democracy won
because it is good and communism lost because it was evil and illegitimate,
therefore the faulty DDR naturally gives way to the freedom of enlightened,
capitalist society. However, the success of this Modell was not initially obvious to
many and continues to be viewed by some with great uncertainty, and even
hostility.
It has been nearly three decades since Germany’s historic Wende and to
some the reunification still resembles a work in progress, not a finished product.
During the 2009 European Parliamentary elections, the question of reunification’s
success was still a hot button topic as polls revealed that schoolchildren in former
Eastern states were vastly misinformed and uneducated about DDR/SED
oppression and had some “rosie-faced” impressions of the former communist
state. Many western politicians and conservatives, including Angela Merkel, raced
to condemn these eastern states and remind the nation that the DDR was an
illegitimate Unrechtstaat like the Nazi Unrechtstaat before it.6 But her conclusion was
not the absolute consensus; various western and eastern politicians alike argued that
the DDR should not be condemned as having been entirely illegitimate.
Furthermore, many more Eastern voices have emerged in the time since
reunification to remind a modern, unified Germany that Ossis (a pejorative for
Eastern Germans) and the old East were not a collective evil. While the
mainstream West has continued to assess East German Vergangenheitbewältigung
along the same black and white good vs. evil terms as denazification, various
alternative accounts, indirect memoirs, debates, and primary sources complicate
this clear-cut, success-story image and suggest that attitudes towards East
Germany’s 40 years under DDR communist rule are, in fact, quite complex and do
not share the kind of consensus which holds the Nazi period as illegitimate and
evil. Above all, this complication is exemplified through the socio-cultural trend of
Ostalgie, or nostalgia for the DDR, which emerged in the two decades following
reunification. Ostalgie, in a broad sense, is a term which entails both a sense of
longing and the memorialization and legitimization of various positive aspects of
“Coming to Terms: Dealing with the Communist Past in United Germany,” Bundesstiftung Zur
Aufarbeitung Der SED Diktatur (Berlin: Bundesstiftung Zur Aufarbeitung Der SED Diktatur)
6 “Was Communist East Germany Unjust or Just Corrupt?” Reuters, May 22, 2009.
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DDR life and culture which were lost in the context of West German, capitalist
takeover. However, the aims and legitimacy of Ostalgie have become polarizing
topics in modern Germany and have raised complicated questions of how the DDR
should be remembered. This essay will attempt to analyze how the trend of Ostalgie
evolved in the decades following reunification and furthermore, how Ostalgie
complicates the West’s simple, good vs. evil success-story-narrative of coming-toterms with communism.
Historiography
The historiography of Ostalgie and reunification has been shaped largely
through political institutions and cultural forces. In years following reunification,
American media outlets such as The New York Times, The Economist and The Chicago
Tribune were quick to label reunification a success and hold Ostalgie as naïve and
fleeting – a trend supported by backward, unenlightened, commie-Easterners.7
Furthermore, these American mainstream media outlets have consistently drawn
parallels between the DDR and the Nazi period in their assessments of Ostalgie,
labeling it as dangerous and antagonistic to the democratic goals of reunification. 8
They are not alone in their assessment as West German outlets, such as Morgenpost
and Tagesspiegel, and German political parties, such as Merkel’s CDU, have done the
same. More recently, certain publications and academics within Germany, including
the news magazine Der Spiegel and political scientist Klaus Schroeder, have been
more hesitant to hail reunification an absolute success. 9 Schroeder’s scholarship
largely blames Ostalgie for the East’s slow Aufarbeitung (reconstruction/catching up)
and dismisses the phenomenon as futile and self-destructive. However other
scholars, historians, and Germanists have recently vouched for the value of
analyzing Ostalgie, both as it relates to Eastern identity constructions and also how
its manifestations in cultural texts such as film, music, and consumer markets
inform East/West reunification narratives. 10 These scholars include historian

Stephen Zeitchik, “German Ostalgie : Fondly Recalling the Bad Old Days,” The New York Times, (New
York City: The New York Times, October 07, 2003); “Ostalgie,” The Economist, (London: The Economist
Group, September 11, 2003); Geyer
8 Hans Christoph Buch, “Schönen Gruß von Charlie Chaplin,” Tagesspiegel, 9 (Berlin: Tagesspiegel,
November 1999); Felix Müller, “Jetzt Wächst Zusammen, Was Zusammengehört,,” Morgenpost (Berlin:
Morgenpost, February 05, 2015)
9 Alexander Neubacher and Michael Sauga. “Germany's Disappointing Reunification: How the East Was
Lost,” Spiegel Online – International, July 01, 2010; Julia Bonstein, “Homesick for a Dictatorship: Majority
of Eastern Germans Feel Life Better under Communism,” Spiegel Online – International, July 03, 2009.
10 Dolores L Augustine, “The Impact of Two Reunification-Era Debates on the East German Sense of
Identity,” German Studies Review 27, no. 3 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004); John T
Littlejohn and Michael T. Putnam, “Rammstein And Ostalgie: Longing for Yesteryear,” Popular Music
and Society 33, no. 1 (London: Taylor & Francis, 2010); Roger F Cook, “Good Bye, Lenin! : Free-Market
Nostalgia for Socialist Consumerism,” Seminar: A Journal of Germanic Studies 43, no. 2 (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); Paul Cooke, “Performing Ostalgie: Leander Haussmanns
Sonnenallee,” German Life and Letters 56, no. 2 (Wiley Online Library, 2003).
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Delores L. Augustine, music historians John T. Littlejohn and Michael T. Putnam,
and Germanists Roger F. Cook and Paul Cooke.
I.

Finding an Eastern Voice in a “Decidedly Western”
Reunification
Firstly, we must consider how reunification was framed by political and
cultural actors within the context of those pivotal Wende-years of 1989 and 1990. By
October 1989, hundreds of thousands of DDR residents were taking to the streets
to peacefully protest for reforms within the communist SED government. As East
Germans marched through Leipzig and Berlin chanting, “Wir sind ein Volk!” (we are
one people), “Demokratie, that’s what I need” and “Freie Presse,” public pressure for East
Germany to reform and reunify was increasing. 11 Meanwhile, behind the walls of
the Palast der Republik, Gorbachev and Honecker were raising a toast to 40 years of
the DDR. Then, on November 9th, a single media blunder occurred – a premature
announcement that East Germans were free to cross the border – and the Berlin
Wall was, at least metaphorically, toppled. In the following weeks, the Wall was
physically toppled and thousands of East Germans took to the streets of a now
borderless Berlin, celebrating deep into the night to the tune of David Hasselhoff’s
“Freedom” with their long-lost West German brothers and sisters. In the following
months, thousands more abandoned their homes and fled to the West for good.
The Berlin Wall’s collapse was met with an incredible surge of both Eastern and
Western euphoric emotion, both sides becoming easily swept up in the
reunification-fever. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl standing before
Dresden’s Frauenkirche in 1989 bellowed out to a crowd of impassioned East
German rally-goers that the “historical hour” had come “for the unity of our
nation.”12 Similarly, SPD party leader and former West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt
echoed the romantic, pan-German atmosphere present in late-1989 when he
asserted, “what belongs together will grow together.” 13 Even 1990’s World Cup of
Soccer hosted in Italy seemed to be playing into the hands of Schicksal (fate) as East
and West Germans collectively celebrated a memorable German win, albeit
technically a West German one.14
Despite the collective enthusiasm, there was not consensus about what a
reunified Germany would look like. In the years of 1989 and 1990 there existed a
legitimate hope for a new alternative; a pan-German community. This community
would be based on the cooperation and integration of East and West Germany

Mal Te, “1989 Demo Während Der Feier Zu 40 Jahren DDR - Protests during Celebrations 40 Years
GDR,” YouTube, November 30, 2016.
12 “Helmut Kohls Rede in Dresden,” MDR Sport | MDR.DE, July 14, 2017.
13 Felix Müller, “Jetzt Wächst Zusammen, Was Zusammengehört,” Zur Startseite, February 05, 2015.
14 “Germany: When East and West Became One,” FIFA, November 22, 2010.
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extending beyond the Communist vs. Capitalist entrenchments of the Cold War.15
However, with the ousting of SED communist hegemony during the DDR’s free
elections of early 1990, the East German planned economy sharply plummeted,
ramping up pressures to unify quickly. In August of 1990, the
Wiedervereinigungsvertrag (Reunification Treaty) was signed, but the nature of the
agreement itself was perhaps not the kind of West-East integration many East
German citizens had been longing for. The treaty was a declaration of East
German accession, in which West German Law, effective immediately, became
East German Law. The former DDR, with the stroke of a pen, became West
Germany. The parameters though which the Reunification Treaty was framed
would become symbolic of the West’s “paternalistic attitude” towards Easterners in
the years to follow. In time, the framework of West German-conquest proved
those earlier hopes for an alternative to be inconsequential. East German
achievements, ideals and personal histories, not to mention consumer products and
culture, soon became not only irrelevant but entirely non-existent in unified
Germany. These were the illegitimate fruits of a failed system. By 1991, the East
German voice had all but disappeared from the Western-dominated reunification
discussion. However, throughout the two decades following Germany’s Wende a
new kind of platform for alternative dialogue emerged in opposition to the Western
status quo which served to give East Germans a voice again: Ostalgie.16
As the reality of reunification shifted away from East/West integration
and towards capitalist, Western conquest, some in the East developed a certain
sense of nostalgia as the products and lifestyles which they were familiar with
disappeared. East German food products like Kaffee Mocha Fix and Spreewaldgürken
were suddenly absent from supermarket shelves, the Trabant automobile factory in
Zwickau ceased its production, jobs were lost, and companies were dissolved. 17
Economic uncertainties in the face of a changing social landscape had left many
Easterners longing for simpler, securer times when work and their pensions were
guaranteed by the communist state. Layoffs, unemployment and homelessness now
threatened many Easterners whose concept of work within a socialist, planned
economy-framework was not equipped for the rapid “shock therapy” transition to
competitive markets. Communist party members and state officials were blacklisted
by the West, but so too were many of the East’s best-and brightest; intellectuals
and even the mildest socialist sympathizers suddenly became social pariah. 18 In
1991, former director of the East German State Bank, Edgar Most, watched as
Easterners were thrown “to the wolves of the West” and became “poorer, older
“Chapter 5. Views of German Reunification,” Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project, September
24, 2018; Augustine, 563.
16 “Merkel to Mark 20th Anniversary of German Reunification Treaty,” Deutschland Online.
17 Augustine; Craig Whitney, “Germans: 5 Years Later: Bitter and Still Divided,” The New York Times.
(New York City: The New York Times, January 24, 1995)
18 Augustine.
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and dumber” through this sudden juxtaposition with the Western society and its
norms.19 Former East Germans were becoming increasingly alienated in this new
Germany, as their achievements, competencies, and basic social norms regarding
work and community were discarded by the dominant West. Shortly after the
Wende, eastern women began noticeably expressing nostalgia towards the liberation
they enjoyed in the socialist system. Official Communist-State ideology had held
women and men as equals and DDR women held full time positions as early as the
1950s right up until reunification.20 Women’s emancipation in the DDR was by no
means perfect and shared criticisms from women both domestically and abroad.
These criticisms called East German women überemanzipiert (over-emancipated).
They were now responsible for both work and domestic life, or were relegated to
only lower-rung positions. Nevertheless, with the new reality of dominant, western
gender norms, some female East-Berliners claimed they felt “discriminated against”
since reunification and reminisced about a better, freer DDR where they “felt more
respected as a woman.”21
More than just grow pains, the nostalgia shared by many East Germans in
the early 1990s contained critiques of the new status-quo, expressing their
frustrations with West German social values and a refusal to “whole heartedly”
accept the framework of reunification. Surveys at the time showed that few
Easterners would have had legitimately hoped for a return to communist SED
dictatorship or Stasi oppression.22 Rather, these expressions of nostalgia
represented dissatisfaction about the loss of East German agency and voice in the
new, West dominated Bundesrepublik. However, not all East Germans were so quick
to express such nostalgic tendencies. The Christian Science Monitor reported in
1994 that, despite the growing disillusionment amongst many East Berliners in the
years after reunification, many were nonetheless largely impatient with Ostalgie, such
as the Alliance ’90 Party which aligned itself with the West’s Green Party and
viewed Eastern nostalgia as a “hindrance”.23 Although a physical wall no longer
separated East and West, it seemed a new, ideological wall was taking shape: Die
Mauer im Kopf. In her 2004 study on East German identity, historian Dolores L.
Augustine of St. John’s University exhibited that even the pejorative terms Ossi and
Wessi did not emerge until the years after reunification. It was at that point that it
became clear to many Easterners and Westerners that some form of group

Neubacher and Sauga.
Sibylle Meyer and Eva Schulze, “After the Fall of the Wall: The Impact of the Transition on East
German Women,” Political Psychology 19, no. 1 (Lund, Sweden: The International Society for Political
Psychology, 1998) 98.
21 “Five Years After Fall of the Wall, Few East Berliners Celebrate,” The Christian Science Monitor,
November 02, 1994.
22 Pew Research Center.
23 “Five Years After Fall of the Wall”
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“othering” was necessary to establish identities in an ideological struggle of Eastern
v. Western Germany.24
Some critics have concluded that such constructions of East German
collective identity and community through nostalgia are illegitimate and only stand
to obstruct reunification’s aims. Political Scientist Klaus Schroeder of Berlin’s
Humbolt University envisions Ostalgie as a kind of East German coping
mechanism, through which disenfranchised East Germans strive to defend their
own “biographies” and achievements by selectively glorifying certain aspects of
their bygone DDR culture while deliberately downplaying other negative ones. For
Schroeder, Ostalgie is nothing more than a distorted view of the past which
“whitewashes” the evils of a totalitarian communist regime and stands in the way of
true reunification-via-Western democracy from being realized.25 Thus, Schroeder
constrains the successes of reunification along the terms of Modell Deutschland;
Germany’s singular path to successful reunification lay in the relinquishment of the
DDR-Unrechtstaat’s legitimacy by ostalgic Easterners and the absolute victory of
Western values. The devaluation of Ostalgie is encouraged by more recent critics
who contend that “downplaying the dictatorship” is a dangerous “price people pay
to preserve their self-respect.”26 They depict Ostalgie as nothing more than an East
German, psychological ‘comfort-blanket’ or delusional hindrance that stunts
successful reunification. Such Western critiques of Ostalgie suggest that evil, SED,
communist dictatorial rule tainted the DDR as a whole, rendering any and all East
German alternatives, critiques of the West, and positive DDR memories as equally
illegitimate
These early manifestations of Ostalgie came at a time of both
disillusionment and great economic uncertainty for once optimistic Easterners.
However, with time, western optimism would, too, give way to more pessimistic
attitudes toward reunification efforts. After the euphoria of the early 90s wore off,
the harsh realities of reunification emerged as various logistical challenges in the
democratization and privatization of the East German economy became drastically
apparent. The demands of de-industrialization, the privatization of Eastern
companies, and the loss of millions of workers who left the East once the Wall fell
put those orchestrating the “sudden political birth” of the new, eastern German
states “under a great deal of pressure.”27 However, the harshest of these realities
was perhaps reunification’s price tag. Billions in Western investment and taxes
“flowed” into the Aufarbeitung of East German historical areas, infrastructure,
education and businesses during the 1990s as West Germans began to experience
what financial burdens unification actually entailed. These logistical and economic
Augustine.
“Ostalgia: Romanticizing the GDR,” Deustche Well, October, 3, 2014
26 Bonstein.
27 Neubacherand Sauga.
24
25

challenges to reunification, with time, seemed to have a significant effect on
western psyches and Westerner’s certainty of the promise of the reunificationsuccess story they saw themselves financing. In 1991, 77% of Westerners believed
that the East would match the West’s standard of living in a 5-10 year time frame –
these estimates proved overambitious.28 By the early 2000s, the triumphalism of
democratizing the East and romantic, pan-German motives seemed to be losing
momentum as many Westerners came to resent the very thing which they had, only
a decade earlier, so fervently set out to do. A Sept. 2004 Pew Center poll revealed
nearly a quarter of all Germans wanted the Berlin Wall rebuilt. 29 Furthermore,
market uncertainties brought about through a currency shift to the Euro in 2002,
the EU expansion in 2004, and the increasing trends of economic globalization left
some Westerners longing for simpler, more stable times. These new economic
tensions and uncertainties were in fact altering many western attitudes towards the
triumphalist-aims and promises of reunification as they were initially framed by the
West. If western, capitalist liberation from the evils of the DDR was the path to
success, then by the early 2000s it was becoming an increasing disagreeable, or
imperfect, one for many Westerners.
II.
Ostalgie for All: The Emergence of Commercial Nostalgia
While the economic uncertainties of the new century and globalism had
brought about a pessimism in western German attitudes towards their own
government’s reunification aims, many Easterners were seeing the dawning of a
new age and their identities and ostalgic practices were changing as well in the years
after 1989. By 2000 East Germans were far better off than they had been a decade
prior, either in the DDR times or during the transitional phases of early
reunification. East Germans reported themselves not only as being financially
better off, but as having greater personal well–being compared with 1991. Even life
expectancy has continued to steadily increase in the nearly thirty years since
reunification.30 By the turn of the 21st century, former East Germans had grown
very much immersed in Western culture. Furthermore, many former East Germans
had moved to the West and a new generation was growing up in a reunified,
capitalist Germany. Ironically, as differences between East and West diminished, a
new type of East German nostalgia emerged – largely amongst a new generation of
Ossis many of whom were too young to remember actual life in the DDR. This
second wave of Ostalgie was uniquely characterized by its manifestation in popular
culture and ability to operate within a Western commercial framework in order to
garner mainstream-Western and even international attention.
“Chapter 5. Views of German Reunification,”
“20% of Germans Want the Wall Back,” The Guardian, September 09, 2004.
30 “Germany: Life Expectancy Has Risen in East Since Reunification, Study Says.” The New York
Times, (New York City: The New York Times, December 21, 2017); “Chapter 5. Views of German
Reunification;” “Chapter 1. End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations;”
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One area in particular where this new kind of Ostalgie emerged was in the
German film industry of the early 21st century. Around the time of reunification,
German cinema was dominated by two trends. One trend was what Roger F. Cook
calls “catch up” comedies. These were comedy films made by wealthy West
German filmmakers which trivialized the lesser developed Ossis through plots
which poked fun at the “errors” and “struggles” for East Germans to literally
catch-up with the West. These films include Go Trabi Go (1991), Das war der wilde
Osten (1992), and Wir können auch anders (1993). The other, less dominant trend in
early 90s German cinema was characterized by former East German filmmakers
who created auteuer films exposing the harsh realities of DDR life or postreunification struggles in the East.31 Not only were western filmmakers reinforcing
paternalistic, West German attitudes towards reunification and the othering of the
silly Ossis through these blockbuster hits, but moreover, they had a monopoly on
the entire German film industry. East German filmmakers who were less affluent
and also less experienced in “working within a film industry geared for commercial
success” simply could not compete to have their voices heard.32 However, that
changed when eastern director Leander Haußmann’s 1999 ostalgic hit-comedy
Sonnenallee broke through the Western dominated market.
Sonnenallee tells a witty coming-of-age story set to the backdrop of 1970’s
East Berlin and presents a rather normalized and charming image of daily life in the
DDR, an obvious divergence from portrayals of the DDR in earlier German
cinema. The film revolves around teenage Micha and his friends who, in their final
year of school, are preoccupied hunting down Western contraband such as Rock n’
Roll records and pornography and clumsily chasing after girls. Daily life for these
characters revolves around Sonnenallee, the Berlin street on which they live and
which also so happens to be intersected by the Berlin Wall with a border crossing
at one end. This leads to countless absurd and humorous encounters with Stasi
agents and border police who are portrayed more-so as buffoons or loveable idiots
than intimidating agents of an oppressive totalitarian state. Haußmann notably
utilizes a kind of self-deprecating humor when looking at everyday life in the East,
as if to detach the ordinary experiences of Micha and his friends’ social lives from
the goals and actions of the communist party which rules them. A notable example
of this is Micha’s encounters with local Freie Deutsche Jugend leaders whose zealous
devotion to communist ideals is portrayed as campy and naïve. Furthermore,
Marxist indoctrination in Micha’s school appears equally ridiculous and is
experienced as a harmless kind of going-through-the-motions routine by these
teens. In the end, Macha finally wins over the heart of his “dream girl,” Miriam,
and the story culminates when its characters and a crowd of East Berliners take to
the Sonnenalle for a delightful song and dance number – a happy ending guaranteed
31
32

Cook, 206-19.
Cook, 208.

to bring smiles to the faces of German movie goers. However, the German press
was less than won-over by Leander Haußmann’s charming, sun-shiny
representation of DDR life.
Reviews of Sonnenallee in the western, German-language press were
nothing short of scathing. Hans Christoph Buch of West Berlin’s Tagesspiel
published a review titled, “Schönen Gruß von Charlie Chaplin,” shortly after the film’s
release in November of 1999. Buch wrote, Haußmann “turned the DDR into a
musical with Erich Honecker as the “Fiddler on the Roof” and glossed over “real
conflicts” with “cheap Ostalgie.”33 Further critics drew comparisons between the
films’ representation of DDR life with that of the Politikomödie genre of film
produced under Joseph Goebbels’ Nazi Reichministerium für Volksaufklärung und
Propaganda.34 Some critics even filed lawsuits claiming “that Sonnenalle was nothing
short of an insult to the victims of the former East German regime.” 35 Western
critics responded to Haußmann’s ostalgic film with the kind of ferocity one might
expect if he had instead produced a sing along comedy set in Auschwitz. The
critiques themselves represent a Western evaluation of Haußmann’s Ostalgie along
Modell Deutschland’s parameters; delegitimize SED communist dictatorship through
the same success-proven Vegangenheitsbewältigung that delegitimizes Nazism.
Therefore, if the communist state was evil like Nazism was evil, then, as German
Minister of Justice Klaus Klinkel claimed in 1991, “not only the Unrechtstaat must
be delegitimized, but the everyday culture practiced in the DDR must be held as
real, lived crime.”36
Sonnenalle, like various other strains of Ostalgie before it, takes issue with
the way the West’s Modell has framed reunification and complicates notions of the
DDR’s absolute illegitimacy by validating various ‘good’ aspects of East German
culture – the sense of community on Sonnenalle or scenes of Micha playing air guitar
to Rolling Stones records surely do not constitute “real, lived crime.” However,
Historian Paul Cooke believes Haußmann’s 1999 box office hit represented the
dawning of a new productive kind of Ostalgie – one that attempts to break down the
Mauer im Kopf (Wall in Head) between Ossis and Wessis, rather than provoke greater
alienation and othering. Cooke notes that Haußmann, through his introspective,
satirical take on the Ossi/Wessi relations, “de-exotifies” East Germans precisely by
mocking the comical and naïve ways in which Westerners in the film observe and
comment on the Easterners on the other side of the fence as if they were observing
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animals at the zoo – “Hey, Ossi, gimme a little wave!,” says one western tourist. 37
Furthermore, Cooke notes that the themes Haußmann utilizes, such as teenage
romance and music, represent universal aspects of the human experience which
function to normalize the East German experience and de-bunk Wessi myths about
the blöde Ossis. However, what makes Haußmann’s ostalgic production so
revolutionary for Cooke, is that it achieves this de-exotification and normalization
of East German daily life within the framework of a commercial product which is
both desirable and easily digestible for western pop culture markets. Simply put,
Sonnenalle is a representation of Ostalgie which reaches Westerners through a
platform they can understand. Despite the moral reservations held by some critics
and opponents, Sonnenallee was a widespread commercial success throughout all of
Germany, not just the East, charting as the highest grossing German-language film
of 1999.38
However, it was soon to be out done by a film, which in using
Haußmann’s same recipe, would bring Ostalgie in cinema to the world stage. If
Sonnenallee was to Ostalgie in western commercial markets what Karl Benz was to the
invention of the automobile, then Wolfgang Becker’s 2003 international hit GoodBye, Lenin! was Henry Ford. Good-Bye, Lenin! far surpassed the commercial success
of Sonnenallee and was wildly popular among Germans, East and West, as well as
reaching international audiences. The film tells the story of Alex Kerner, an East
German twenty-something year old who becomes largely disenchanted with life in
the DDR. In October of 1989, days before the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Alex
takes to the streets to join the protests parading through Berlin. When Alex’s
mother, Christiane, who was an ardent communist party member and community
leader, sees her son being seized by the Volkspolizei, she has a heart attack and falls
to the ground. While Christiana spends the following eight months in a coma, the
Berlin Wall comes down and Germany reunifies. When she awakes, doctors warn
Alex that any kind of major excitement could cause another, this time fatal, heart
attack. Fearful that the colossal news of reunification will inevitably mean his
mother’s sudden death, Alex concludes that he must recreate a fictional, mini
version of the now extinct DDR within the confines of his mother’s small
apartment. However, this endeavor becomes impossibly challenging (and
increasingly comical) as Alex, his girlfriend, and coworker are constantly rewriting
history through fake, homemade, news programs and fabricated alternative
storylines to the events of 1989 and 1990. In one notable scene, Alex’s mother
escapes from her room to find western advertisements and automobiles in her
neighborhood. Alex reacts by doctoring news footage to make it appear that
“disillusioned” Westerners are flooding into the “more virtuous” East.
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Many western critics responded to Good-Bye Lenin! with negativity, echoing
past critiques of Sonnenalle. In the U.S., The New York Times’ Steven Zeitchik labeled
the film as “fondly recalling the bad old days.” Zeitchik even draws the same old
parallels between Ostalgie and post-Nazi Vergangenheitsbewältigung: “Did we have
movements in the 1960's singing songs about how great the Nazis were and all the
roads they built?"39 However, Becker’s masterpiece did more than simply paint a
rosy, far-fetched image of East German social life. Through Alex Kerner’s creation
of an ideal, alternate version of the DDR in his mother’s apartment, Good-Bye Lenin!
functions as a microcosm for the entire trend of Ostalgie in that it constructs an
East German identity through those promises of what the DDR could have been
and not what it, in its entirety, actually was. Furthermore, Alex’s imagined,
alternate-DDR represents as a kind of idyllic, “third way” alternative between actual
DDR life under the corrupt SED regime and the reality of shallow western,
capitalism. This is demonstrated when Alex finds himself delving deeper into the
myth he has created and begins to find a kind of refuge in this alternate reality:
“Somehow my scheme had taken on a life of its own. The GDR I created for her
increasingly became the one I might have wished for.” Lastly, as moviegoers
‘escape’ from the ‘real’ world and lose themselves in Becker’s story, the film GoodBye, Lenin! itself serves as a kind of imagined space where both eastern and western
Germans could participate in alternatives to the reality of a “decidedly western”
reunification.”40 This space extended beyond the Mauer im Kopf and beyond Modell
Deutschland’s one-sided path to success as it invited Easterners and Westerners alike
to consider Alex Kerner’s idyllic, and caring “real, living” socialist society as a
potential alternative to individualistic, consumption-driven western culture.
This “imagined space” for alternative discourse Ostalgie proved was not
only highly appealing to disillusioned Easterners, but to Westerners as well who, by
the early 2000s, where reflecting new doubts about German, European, and global
capitalism. Following the release and commercial success of Good-Bye Lenin!, a
demand for ostalgic goods and experiences was causing a market-boom in
commercialized Ostalgie, with western Germans being among the biggest sellers and
consumers. Furthermore, this Ostalgie-wave was emerging at a time when Western
politicians and journalists were leading a new crusade to condemn DDR injustices
by digging up or even piecing together shredded Stasi surveillance files.41
Nevertheless, countless new markets for East German items and brands that
disappeared after Wende were popping up in the wake of Good-Bye, Lenin! offering
socialist, DDR “clothes, music, films, food, and even original banknotes and
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medals” all for a marked-up price.42 Even a market for genuine DDR experiences
began emerging, offerring alternatives to Western “lifstyles or vacationing” such as
DDR themed hotels.43 In September of 2003, The Economist reported that in
Germany’s East and West, “Ostalgie is all the rage” as the popularity of “Goodbye
Lenin” had “swept the nation.” However, The Economist warned of not only a
potential economic “bubble-burst,” but suggested that through this “wild
repackaging of German history,” Germans are “kidding themselves” that the DDR
was “a sort of Utopia.” 44 Other critics seemed to highlight the paradox represented
by a commercial market for nostalgic, some might say fetish, goods that belonged
to a society which, in theory, ascribed no value to such consumerism. However,
Ostalgie was inevitably shifting into a western commercial framework, offering a
means for Easterners and Westerners alike to critique, resist, or escape competitive
and shallow capitalist consumer culture through participation in socialist
alternatives. Ostalgie in the wake of Sonnenallee’s commercial appeal, as Robert Julien
Hartmann notes, was becoming streamlined, or some might say hijacked, through a
Western commercial framework, “crafted” in “West German marketing
departments, advertising agencies and even film studios: Wolfgang Becker’s GoodBye, Lenin! was after all, written and produced by Wessis.45
The music industry represented yet another commercial market into
which the trend of Ostalgie was expanding by the early 2000s. In 2001, eastern
German pop artist Kai Niemann released his single Im Osten (In the East) which
proved to be a hit success throughout Germany. In the lyrics, Niemann
humorously tells listeners of all the things Ossis do better than Wessis. According to
Neimann “men in the East kiss better”, “the girls in the East are prettier,” “that the
Wall in the East held better,” and that “actually, practically everything is somewhat
better in the East as in the West.”46 The Tagesspiegel’s Rüdiger Strauch, in a scathing
critique of the song, called Niemann “the dumb Ossi with the big hit,” and labeled
the song as nothing more than a satisfaction of an Ossi “need for revenge” against
the West. However, the song received considerable playtime on Germany’s Munich
based MTV station and one western MTV producer defended the song, remarking
that MTV’s fans are largely oblivious to the song’s message, but rather, enjoy the
song’s upbeat style.47 The debate surrounding the song did not stop in 2001.
Viewer comments under the Niemann recording of “Im Osten” on Youtube reflect
the continued debate around the issue of East German identity and Germany’s
“Ostalgia: Romanticizing the GDR”
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pattern for coming-to-terms with the DDR past. One reviewer wrote, “Good that
I’m an Ossi! Go ahead and laugh at me,” while another commented, “With songs
like these one doesn’t achieve a common identity, but rather the opposite. How sad
that so many in the East find this song so great.” 48
By 2004, Grammy nominated, German metal band Rammstein was
reaching the zenith of its commercial success with the release of their fourth studio
album REISE, REISE and the group was, too, riding Ostalgie’s commercial wave.
The band’s six original members were all born and raised in the DDR and formed
Rammstein shortly after reunification in the early 1990s. Rammstein has been one
of Germany’s most successful musical acts both at home and abroad since
reunification and currently holds the crown as the most successful German
language music act in US history. However, their strong politically driven lyrics and
shockingly grotesque, live-show spectacles have long been criticized in the Western
media, notably Rammstein’s use of pyrotechnics and sexual, sadomasochistic
themes. During one 1998 US tour, lead singer Till Lindermann was arrested after
simulating anal-sex at a show in Worcester, Massachusetts. 49 However, Rammstein
has ignited perhaps the most controversy through its deliberate use of ostalgic, antireunification, anti-Western lyrics and themes.
As Germany celebrated the 15th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall
and the West’s great victory over communism, Rammstein was busy in the studio,
conjuring up powerful critiques of the West, capitalism, and the BRD’s framing of
reunification. As authors John T. Littlejohn and Michael T. Putnam point out in
their 2010 study “Rammstein and Ostalgie: Longing for Yesteryear,” the band’s 2004
album REISE, REISE revolves around a contrast of East and West highlighted by
back-to-back songs “Amerika” and “Moskau” located in the middle of the album’s
track-list.50 “Amerika” achieved widespread commercial success in Germany and
the US, but its lyrics depict a highly negative view of US cultural imperialism and
capitalist consumerism. In the song, the United States is depicted as “dance
master” who wants to lead or “führen” the dancers (nations of the world) as violins
play to the tune of freedom and music “comes from the White House.” The chorus
then repeats the lines “We’re all living in Amerika, Amerika, it’s wunderbar.”
Furthermore, the song tells of Santa Claus coming to Africa, of Coca-Cola and
Wonderbras, and that “in front of Paris,” Europe’s cultural center, “stands Mickey
Mouse,” a direct reference to Disney World Paris. “Amerika” represents a strong
critique of the dominant, US-led western consumer culture which enveloped the
East after reunification’s lop-sided, “decidedly western” outcome. “Amerika” is
then juxtaposed with the album’s next track “Moskau,” in which the singer
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confesses his mixed emotions, but nevertheless, undying love for the Soviet capital
city: “This song is about the most beautiful city in the world. Moscow! This city is a
prostitute…she’s fat, yet so lovely…she is old and nevertheless beautiful.”
Littlejohn and Putnam argue that these songs represent the antagonistic factors at
play in ostalgic East German identity constructions; Rammstein is dissatisfied with
western culture and opts to fondly reflect on the socialist east, despite “her”
obvious imperfections.51 In exposing their flaws, the album rejects both “Amerika”
(the U.S.) and “Moskau” (the old East) as being ideal models while simultaneously
expressing nostalgia for the latter, the implication being that nostalgia and criticism
are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
In an interview regarding the ostalgic themes present in Rammstein’s 2004
international best-selling album, lead guitarist Paul Landers remarked, “Nobody
who’d ever lived there liked the DDR very much. That was true for me as well.
[But] then I saw the entire polished surface of the West and thought it needed to be
destroyed.”52 This tension present in East German identities simply does not fit
nicely into the West’s Modell Deutschland success story of good overcoming evil –
particularly when the good-guys do not seem so good anymore. Rather, some
Easterners have been critical that in the “victor’s writing of history” and in the
“public’s perception,” there only exists “victims and perpetrators” and “winners
and losers,” with the “masses” of average citizens who led legitimate lives being
herded into these binary categories.53 Many Easterners acknowledged the
imperfections of the DDR, but reflected dissatisfaction with a mainstream society,
which in its attempt to come-to-terms with the DDR, has held western capitalism
to be the be-all-end-all perfect substitute. One East German recounts to Der
Spiegel’s Julia Bonstein in the article “Homesick for a Dictatorship,” “I’m better off
today than I was before [the Wende],” “but I am not more satisfied.”54 Rammstein’s
ostalgic music engages its listeners in alternative discourse which refutes the
simplified success story of good capitalism and bad communism. This is achieved
through Rammstein’s tarnishing the West’s “polished surface” and reminding
listeners, that despite its imperfections, the DDR did do a few things right – and
those ‘things’ should not be defeated through the West’s absolutist, yet
problematic, success-story narrative. Like Sonnenallee and Good-Bye, Lenin!,
Rammstein’s ostalgic music, through its commercial framework and appeal in the
West, proved to be an outlet through which many dissatisfied eastern and western
voices could explore alternatives to what an increasing number of people found to
be the unappealing reality of capitalism’s status-quo.
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III.
Conclusion: Off of the shelf and into the political spotlight
Lastly, we should consider Berlin’s relatively new DDR Museum and how
in recent years some attitudes towards Ostalgie have changed. The museum officially
opened in 2006, but began as a project started by Westerner Peter Kenzelmann
who “grew frustrated during a visit to Berlin after searching in vain for a museum
dedicated” to the former East.55 Accumulating its collections through public
donations, the museum gathers the pieces and artifacts of 40 years of DDR history
and “assembles” them into a family-friendly, educational, and thematically
organized consumer experience. According to Kenzelmann, the museum was
designed to make museum-goers feel as if they were “discovering” a lost world.
Exhibits involve a high level of interactive experiences in which the museum-goer
smells, feels, and tastes the DDR. Furthermore, the tone found throughout the
inscriptions and videos in the exhibit rooms is a rather playful and joking one,
guaranteeing an enjoyable consumer experience for the museum’s, and any
museum’s for that matter, target audience: tourists – specifically western tourists.
Even the DDR themed restaurant located at the end of the exhibits seems to cap
off a perfect consumer experience. The museum makes sure, however, not to shy
away from the DDR’s dark side; one can simulate a Stasi interrogation or listen in
on Stasi surveillance. Nevertheless, Berlin’s DDR Museum has attracted sharply
negative criticisms by those in the West and East for presenting too “soft” a picture
of communist Germany. Spokesman of the German Historical Museum, Rudolf
Trabold, “dismissed the DDR Museum project as shallow Ostalgie” when he
stated, “There’s really no need for this museum…it’s on the level of ‘Goodbye
Lenin’…sort of like saying, ‘Oh, wasn’t it all nice?’.”56 On the other hand, some
Easterners were rather displeased with the museum’s western triumphalist
undertones which suggest the “comical” East German practices, products and
lifestyles were now as defunct and antiquated as the DDR itself.57
For the public activist group Dritte Generation Ost, or “Third Generation
East,” which was founded in 2009 by both eastern and western Germans, the DDR
is not yet ready to be put in a museum. Memorializing something through a history
museum presumes that thing to be, more-or-less, finished business. However, these
young Germans have grown frustrated with the West’s channeling of Ostalgie into
commercial markets. They, themselves are not ready to be ostalgic. For them,
reunification still represents unfinished business and participation in alternative,
Ostalgic consumption, only serves to emotionally alleviate real, legitimate, political
criticisms of German capitalist society.58
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On November 9th, 2009, world leaders gathered before Berlin’s
Brandenburg Gate to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Berlin Wall’s
collapse. The event was a truly incredible televised spectacle as hundreds of
thousands watched as 1,000 massive, graffiti laden domino pieces set off a chain
reaction along a two kilometer stretch which the Wall once followed. Angela
Merkel called the event a “celebration for the whole of Europe” and U.S. President,
Barack Obama, stated, “Human destiny is what human beings make of it.” 59 The
event’s message was clear – western democracy has triumphantly succeeded in
overcoming communism. As Dritte Generation Ost founding member and westerner,
Adriana Lettrari, watched the event unfold on her television, she could not help but
become angry as the same, old “one-sided narrative” which has dominated
reunification discourse for the past two decades played out before her eyes once
again.60
Since reunification, mainstream German society and western journalism
has framed coming-to-terms with its communist past largely through the same
Modell West Germany has used in overcoming the Nazi past. This form of
Vergangenheitsbewältigung constrains its successes within a good vs. evil narrative –
just as the Nazi’s illegitimate Unrechtstaat must be disavowed and substituted with
‘good’ capitalist, western democracy, so too must the DDR’s illegitimate Unrechtstaat
be disavowed, replaced and regretted through some kind of post-communist
Erbschuld -guilt. Thus, this framework suggests that in order for Easterners to
come-to-terms with their communist past, they must recognize its illegitimacy and
embrace the West’s morally superior capitalism. Ostalgie, since its emergence among
Easterners in the early 1990s to its widespread commercial manifestations in the
2000s, has complicated this “one-sided” narrative by creating alternatives, or “third
ways” between the reality of DDR dictatorship, and Western capitalist conquest –
even if these alternatives arise out of nostalgic, imagined reconstructions of the
DDR past. Furthermore, Ostalgie has highlighted the West’s problematic framework
of ‘good’ capitalism overcoming ‘evil’ socialism through its appeal to the West as an
outlet for critiques and alternatives to capitalism’s assumed ‘goodness.’ However, as
Ostalgie has evolved to appeal to a wider audience through commercialization, we
find that ostalgic films, music, and products have only functioned to create
hypothetical alternatives and emotional pacifications of capitalism’s real social and
political shortcomings – Ostalgie merely illuminates this problem with Modell
Deutschland rather than remedying it. In moving beyond the Ostalgic fixations of
their parent’s generation, Dritte Generation Ost, through political activism, is
attempting to bring these alternative perspectives out of the imagined realm of Alex
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Kerner’s idealist DDR in Good-Bye, Lenin! and into modern political discussions of
redefining East/West conciliation.
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